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TORTS

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) defines government liability for the
tortious conduct of its employees.' Before enactment of the FTCA, parties
injured by the negligent acts of government employees sought a private relief
bill directly from Congress.2 To effectively address the growing number of
claims, and to provide a more accessible remedy, Congress enacted the FTCA
in 1946.? The FTCA waives sovereign immunity, allowing claims for injury
caused by the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of government employees. Private parties may hold the United States liable if the law of the state
where the act or omission occurred would impose liability on a private individual, subject to certain limitations.4
This Survey reviews Tenth Circuit holdings on three FTCA cases decided
during the Survey period.5 These cases focused on three issues: the discretionary function exception, the government's liability as an employer of independent contractors, and the government's reversionary interest in future damages
awarded to private citizens. In two cases, Tew v. United States6 and Bowman
v. United States (Bowman II),' the court utilized conventional analyses in determining government liability. In the third case, Hill v. United States (Hill
II),8 the court struck new ground in finding that the government maintained a
reversionary interest in future damages awarded to a private citizen.
I.

GOVERNMENT LIABILTY UNDER THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
EXCEPTION

A. Background
1. The Discretionary Function Exception
The FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity is narrow in scope and subject
to several exceptions. The discretionary function exception provides that private parties cannot hold the government liable for "[a]ny claim based upon ... the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a

1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 2401-2402, 2411-2412, 2671-2680 (1994).
2. Mark A. Dombroff, United States Government Liability, in AIRCRAFr CRASH LrGATION
1984, at 227, 236 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 267, 1984).
3. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812, 842-47 (1946). See generally 1 LESTER S. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL
REMEDIES, § 65.01, at 3-3 to 3-4 (1964) (discussing the two dominant objectives for enacting the
statute).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
5. The survey period extended from September 1995 through August 1996.
6. 86 F.3d 1003 (10th Cit. 1996).
7. 65 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995) (Bowman 1/).
8. 81 F.3d 118 (10th Cir. 1996) (Hill 1ll), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 56 (1996).
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discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."9 Application of this exception evolved through a series of United States Supreme
Court cases, most recently in Berkovitz v. United States'° and United States v.
Gaubert."
In Berkovitz, the Court developed a two-part test for applying the discretionary function exception. First, courts must consider whether a government
agent's judgment or choice produced the questionable conduct. 2 If no element of choice or judgment existed, the court should neither find discretion
nor apply the exception. 3 If a court concludes that the conduct involved an
element of judgment, then it must make a second determination: whether the
exception shields that type of judgment from judicial review.'4 The Berkovitz
Court concluded that Congress intended to shield only conduct that involved
the permissible exercise of policy judgment."
Gaubert addressed government conduct subject to the discretionary function exception. ' The Court rejected a distinction based on the level of government at which the decision making occurred. 7 The Gaubert Court focused
on the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor.' In applying
the Berkovitz two-part test, the Gaubert Court held that when a federal statute,
regulation, or agency guideline gave discretion to a government agent, a presumption arose that the agent's conduct was properly grounded in public policy. 9 Berkovitz and Gaubert developed a discreet discretionary function exception analysis, which allows for a flexible and broad application.'

9. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994).
10. 486 U.S. 531 (1988). See generally Irl L Nathan, Torts-Governmental Immunity-Causes of Action Stemming from FederalGovernment's Negligence in Implementing Mandatory Regulations or Statutes Are Not Barred by DiscretionaryFunction Exception of Federal Tort
Claims Act: Berkovitz v. United States, 20 ST. MARY's LJ. 1018 (1989) (discussing the Supreme
Court's analysis); Thomas H. (Speedy) Rice, Berkovitz v. United States: Has a Phoenix Arisen
form the Ashes of Varig?, 54 J. Ant L. & CoM. 757 (1989) (discussing Supreme Court and federal
circuit decisions leading up to Berkovitz and Berkovitz's effect on discretionary function exception
analysis); Patricia M. Clarke, Note, Torts---The DiscretionaryFunction Exception: Immunity for
the Negligent Execution of Agency Policy--Berkovitz v. United States, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 281
(1988) (concluding that the Court incorrectly decided Berkovitz and thereby inappropriately expanded government immunity and contradicted Congressional intent).
11. 499 U.S. 315 (1991). See generally Carolyn K. Dick, United States v. Gaubert: Potential
Liability for Federal Regulations Under the "DiscretionaryFunction" Exception of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 36 S.D. L. REv. 180 (1991) (analyzing the applicability of the discretionary function exception to federal regulators who assume operational control of financial institutions).
12. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 536-37.
16. Gaubert,499 U.S. at 325-26.
17. Id. at 325 ("A discretionary act is one that involves choice or judgment; there is nothing
in that description that refers exclusively to policymaking or planning functions... [djiscretionary
conduct is not confined to the policy or planning level.").
18. Id.
19. Id. at 324.
20. See generally David S. Fishback & Gail Killefer, The DiscretionaryFunction Exception
to the Federal Tort Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz, 25 IDAHo L. REV. 291 (1989)
(reviewing discretionary function exception case law and concluding that there is a sensible framework rooted in Congressional intent for applying the exception); William P. Kratzke, The Supreme
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2. The Suits in Admiralty Act
The Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA), 2' like the FICA, waives sovereign
immunity. The SAA, however, applies specifically to maritime issues.' It
allows suit against the government if, under similar circumstances, the plaintiff
could maintain an admiralty proceeding against a private vessel and/or cargo
owner.' The FTCA and SAA provide mutually exclusive jurisdiction." The
SAA does not explicitly contain a discretionary function exception.
B. Tew v. United States'
1. Facts
Robert Tew died when his raft capsized on the Illinois River.' The accident occurred after Tew's raft passed over an underwater structure constructed
by a private citizen without the consent of the govemment.' The Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps) knew of the structure, but neither the Corps nor
the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) had removed it or placed warning markers near it.'
Representatives of Tew brought a wrongful death action under the FTCA
and SAA claiming that the Corps and the Coast Guard had negligently failed
to mark or remove the obstruction." The district court granted summary
judgment for the United States."

Court'sRecent Overhaul of the DiscretionaryFunctionException to the FederalTorts Claims Act,
7 ADMIN. LJ.AM. U. 1 (1993) (concluding that recent Supreme Court cases offer flexible guidelines rather than precise tests in applying the discretionary function exception); Donald N.
Zillman, Protecting Discretion: JudicialInterpretationof the DiscretionaryFunction Exception to
the FederalTort Claims Act, 47 ME. L. REv. 365 (1995) (reviewing Supreme Court precedent and
all federal court decisions interpreting the discretionary function exception since Berkovitz).
21. 46 U.S.C. app. § 742 (1994).
22. See generally 1 PAUL S. EDELMAN, MARITME INJURY AND DEATH 459-79 (1960);
GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 11-11 (1957); James C.
Helfrich, Suits Against the United States Pursuantto the SIAA, PVA, EAA, FTCA, and FECA, 26
TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 121, 124-25 (1982); Kathryn C. Nielsen, Comment, The DiscretionaryFunction Exception and the Suits in Admiralty Act: A Safe Harborfor Negligence?, 4 PUGET SOUND L.
REv. 385, 386-88 (1981).
23. 46 U.S.C. app. § 742 ("In cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated,
or if such cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or property were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained, any appropriate nonjury proceeding...
may be brought against the United States ...
.
24. See Ashland v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 711 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
that SAA provided exclusive jurisdiction for maritime torts); Keene Corp. v. United States, 700
F.2d 836, 843 n.ll (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that the jurisdictional bases of the FTCA and SAA are
mutually exclusive); EDELMAN, supra note 22, at 479; DANIEL A. MORIS, FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS § 12.1 (1993); Helfrich, supra note 22, at 126-27. But cf Jones & Laughlin Steel, Inc. v.
Mon River Towing, Inc., 772 F.2d 62, 64-65 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that FTCA includes jurisdiction over maritime torts except for those torts for which a remedy was provided by the SAA or
Public Vessels Act).
25. 86 F.3d 1003 (10th Cir. 1996).
26. Tew, 86 F.3d at 1004.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id
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2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit first reviewed the FTCA and SAA as waivers of the
United States' sovereign immunity." As a matter of first impression, the
court then considered whether the SAA contained an implied discretionary
function exception.32 The court stated that the FTCA's discretionary function
exception maintained the separation of powers by preventing independent
judicial review of legislative and administrative decisions.33 Since adherence
to the doctrine of separation of powers remains equally desirable in maritime
issues,34 the court found a discretionary function exception in the SAA. 3
The court then applied the two-part test for the discretionary function
exception set forth in Berkovitz. In order for the United States' conduct to
fall within the exception, it must: (1) involve an element of judgment or
choice, and (2) be grounded in public policy considerations."
Tew argued that the United States had a non-discretionary duty to mark or
remove the underwater structure.3" Specifically, Tew asserted that 14 U.S.C.
§ 86 required the Coast Guard to mark the structure, and 33 U.S.C. §§ 403,
409, 414, and 415 required the Corps to remove the structure. 39
The court concluded that 14 U.S.C. § 86 gave the Secretaries of Transportation and Navy discretion to mark obstructions.' When delegated to the
Coast Guard District Commanders, the authority maintained its discretionary
character.4' Further, the court concluded that the Coast Guard primarily based
its decision to leave the obstruction unmarked on economic considerations. '2
The court held that the Coast Guard properly based its exercise of discretion
on such public policy considerations. 3 Therefore, the Coast Guard's conduct
fell within the discretionary function exception."
The court then reviewed 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 409, 414, and 415. Section
403 and accompanying regulations prohibit the creation of obstructions in
navigable waters.4' The court concluded that the regulations did not create a
duty to remove obstructions.' In fact, it expressly refused to create a non-

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 1004-05.
Id. at 1005.
Id.
Id.

35. Id. The Tenth Circuit's decision is in line with the majority of the circuits. Id. For criticism of this imputation, see Nielsen, supra note 22, at 403-14.
36. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
37. Tew, 86 F.3d at 1005.
38. Id. at 1005-06.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1006. The court specifically pointed to the language of the statute which states that
the "secretary may mark... any sunken vessel or other obstruction existing on the navigable
waters ... of the United States in such manner and for so long as, in his judgment, the needs of
maritime navigation require." Id. (quoting 14 U.S.C. § 86) (emphasis in original).
41. Id. (citing 33 C.F.R. § 64 (1991)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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discretionary duty.'
Sections 409, 414 and 415, commonly known as the Wreck Act, prohibit
obstruction of navigable waters and require owners of obstructions to mark
and remove them.' If the owner does not remove the obstruction, the Act
permits the Secretary of the Army to remove it.' The court held that neither
the statutes nor the accompanying regulations created a requirement that the
Army remove obstructions.' Rather, language such as "shall have the right to
remove" and "may undertake to remove" indicated the existence of government discretion." Further, the court held that the Corps' decision not to remove the obstruction fell within the discretionary function exception since the
Corps based its decision on public policy considerations regarding allocation
of limited resources. 2
The court concluded that since the Corps' and the Coast Guard's conduct
fell within the exception, the district court did not retain subject matter jurisdiction to review the claims. 3 Therefore, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. 4
C. Other Circuits
During the survey period, two other circuits addressed the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA and the SAA. In Baldassaro v. United
States, 5 the Fifth Circuit first found that the SAA contained an implied discretionary function exception. 6 After considering the wording of relevant
statutes, the court determined that the government's decision regarding the de5
sign of bunks in National Defense Reserve Fleet vessels was discretionary.
Further, the government properly grounded the decision in public policy."
The court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to rebut a presumption, defined in Gaubert, that the government grounded its decision in the same policy
considerations which underlie the statute authorizing discretion.59
In Glacier Bay United Cook Inlet Drift Ass'n v. Trinidad Corp.,' the
Ninth Circuit also held that the SAA contained an implied discretionary function exception.6' The court then considered each contested government action

47. Id. ("[Niothing contained in this Part shall establish a non-discretionary duty on the part
of district engineers nor shall deviation from these procedures give rise to a private right of action
against a district engineer.") (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 326.1 (1991)).
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 414, 415).
50. Id.at 1006-07.
51. Id. at 1006.
52. Id. at 1007.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 64 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116 S. CL 1823 (1996).
56. Baldassaro,64 F.3d at 208.
57. Id. at 209.
58. Id. at211.
59. Id. at 212.
60. 71 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995).
61. Glacier Bay, 71 F.3d at 1450.
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separately to determine if government agents possessed discretion.' The
court concluded that where relevant manuals gave mandatory instructions or
required decisions involving the application of objective scientific standards,
the discretionary function exception did not apply.63
D. Analysis
Application of the discretionary function exception within the FTCA highlights two conflicting Congressional objectives. First, Congress intended to
provide private parties with a viable remedy when harmed by government
employees.' The FTCA. sought to have the United States treated "in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances .. . ." Secondly, Congress restricted government liability through
the discretionary function exception to prevent judicial second-guessing of
legislative and administrative decisions grounded in policy.'
Courts must necessarily balance these conflicting objectives.' In Tew,
the Tenth Circuit chose to limit judicial review of policy-based government
decision making. This conclusion, as discussed above, comports with recent
Supreme Court decisions and those of other federal circuits." -Further, the
relevant federal statutes and regulations clearly defined the removal of obstructions as discretionary conduct. In addition, the government made decisions
based on the quintessential legislative policy choice of allocating limited re-

62. Id. at 1451.
63. Id. at 1452-53. See generally D. Scott Barash, Comment, The DiscretionaryFunction
Exception and MandatoryRegulations, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 1300, 1327-34 (1987).
64. See Dombroff, supra note 2, at 236.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
66. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988) (citing United States v. S.A.
Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)); see also
Kratzke, supra note 20, at 7 ("Certainly resolution of political questions or agency policy should
not occur in the context of a negligence suit .... Court scrutiny of government conduct for unreasonableness... should occur only in a setting where it will not affect the very essence of
government activity.").
67. For criticism that the scope of the exception is too wide, see John W. Bagby & Gary L.
Gittings, The Elusive Discretionary Function Exception From Government Tort Liability: The
Narrowing Scope of Federal Liability, 30 Am. Bus. LJ. 223, 268-69 (1992); Harold J. Krent,
PreservingDiscretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence:FederalGovernmental Liability in Tort, 38
UCLA L. REV. 871, 915 (1991); Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The DiscretionaryFunctionException
of the FederalTort ClaimsAct: Time For Reconsideration,42 OKLA. L. REv. 459, 479-81 (1989);
Barry R. Goldman, Note, Can the King Do No Wrong? A New Look at the DiscretionaryFunction
Exception to the FederalTort Claims Act, 26 GA. L. REV. 837, 858-60 (1992).
68. See generally Richard P. Shafer, Annotation, Liability of United States for Failure to
Warn of Danger or HazardResulting from GovernmentalAct or Omission as Affected by "Discretionary Function or Duty" Exception to Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.S. § 2680(a)), 65
A.L.R. FED. 358 (1983); Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Claims Based on Constructionand Maintenance of Public Property as Within Provision of 28 USCS § 2680(a) Excepting from Federal
Tort Claims Act Claims Involving "DiscretionaryFunction or Duty," 37 A.L.R. FED. 537, 588-91
(1978); Michael J. Kaplan, Annotation, Liability of United States for Injuries or Damage Resulting
from Failure to Establish, or Properly Maintain or Operate, Aids to Maritime Navigation, 19
A.L.R. FED. 297 (1974).
69. See supra notes 41, 48, 52 and accompanying text. After determining that this first prong
of the Berkovitz test was satisfied, the Tenth Circuit could have used the presumption analysis laid
out in Gaubert. The court would have then focused on the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence
in rebutting a presumption that the government's acts were grounded in policy.
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sources.70 One may argue that the Corps and Coast Guard should have utilized a safer policy, however Congress did not intend to allow courts to review
such policy decisions under the FI'CA.7
II. GOVERNMENT LIABILrTY As EMPLOYER OF AN INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR

A. Background
1. The FTCA
The FTCA allows claims against the United States if a private individual
would be liable to the claimant "in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred."' Federal courts must therefore apply the relevant law of the state where the conduct occurred. In Bowman II, the Tenth
Circuit construed Wyoming law regarding an owner's duty toward the employees of independent contractors."
2. Relevant State Law
Under Wyoming law, an owner may be liable to employees of independent contractors for injury caused by an unsafe condition on the owner's premises. 7' However, the law does not require owners to protect independent
contractor employees from hazards incidental to the work performed.75 The
owner's delegated control of the job site to the independent contractor provides the rationale behind this exception. 6 If an owner retains sufficient control
over part of the work, such as directing performance or assuming affirmative
duties for safety,' the exception does not apply.78

70. See Domme v. United States, 61 F.3d 787, 793 (10th Cit. 1995) (concluding that Dept.
of Energy's inspection decisions were based on policy decision of how to utilize limited resources); Baum v. United States, 986 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that the National Park Service's
decision on how to best allocate resources was inherently based on economic policy); Johnson v.
United States Dep't of Interior, 949 F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that National Park
Service's decisions to undertake search and rescue missions were properly based on policy consideration of best use of limited economic resources); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556 (7th
Cir. 1980) (concluding that allocation of funds for construction of navigation aids requires policy
judgments). See generally Kratzke, supra note 20, at 46 (stating that courts are unable to adequately review the reasonableness of government decisions involving the pursuit of competing
goals with limited resources).
71. See Bowman v. United States, 820 F.2d 1393, 1395 (4th Cir. 1987) (no relationship to
Bowman I or Bowman 11) ("What is obvious is that the decision was the result of a policy judgment. One can argue that another policy ... is more desirable. However, by the discretionary
function exception, Congress intended to prevent courts from second-guessing federal policy.").
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
73. For other examples of government tort liability as a property owner, see Kathleen M.
Doff, Annotation, Federal Tort Claims Act: Liability of United States for Injury or Death Resulting from Condition of Premises,91 A.L.R. FED. 16 (1989).
74. Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890, 894 (Wyo. 1986). For general background
on the liability of owners/employers to independent contractors and the independent contractors'
employees, see THEOPmLus J. MOLL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS
AND EMPLOYERS' LtABILITY (1910); 2 ROBERT W. WOOD, LEGAL GUIDE TO INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS 325-49 (2d ed. 1996).
75. Jones, 718 P.2d at 894.
76. Id. at 895.
77. Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205, 211-12 (Alaska 1982).
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B. Bowman v. United States"
1. Facts
In October 1989, John Bowman, Inc. (JBI) entered into a government
contract with the Air Force to repair historic housing on F. E. Warren Air
Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming.' JBI, an independent contractor,"
maintained direct supervisory responsibility over the work and safety of its
employees." The contract required JBI to comply with federal safety regulations, including provision of guards on all circular saws."3 The United States
reserved the right to inspect the job site for compliance with the terms of the

contract." JBI employed Mearl Dean Bowman" as a carpenter on the
project." While attempting to use a saw that lacked a safety guard, Bowman
severely injured his right hand after it became caught in the saw blade."
Mearl Bowman sought damages for his injuries, and his wife sought damages for loss of consortium." The Bowmans alleged that the United States,
through its inspectors, knew or should have known of the missing saw guard

and negligently failed to take corrective action. 9 The district court granted
the government's motion for summary judgment.
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit first reviewed the extent of the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity.9 The court acknowledged that a claimant may sue the government if a private defendant would be liable according to the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.' The court then continued with a
review of the relevant Wyoming state law.
Relying on Jones v. Chevron,93 the court stated that employees of independent contractors may hold a property owner liable only if the owner maintained control over the hazard that caused the harm.94 If the owner "retain[ed]

78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965).
79. 65 F.3d (10th Cir. 1995) (Bowman 1/).
80. Bowman I, 65 F.3d at 857.
81. Bowman v. United States, 821 F.Supp. 1442, 1445 (D. Wyo. 1993) ("The contract evidences that the intent of the parties was to create an independent contractor relationship in that
[JBI] obligated itself to perform all operations necessary to repair the housing units under the
language of the contract") (Bowman 1), aff d, 65 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995) (Bowman !/).
82. Bowman 11, 65 F.3d at 857.
83. 1&
84. li
85. No familial relationship existed between plaintiffs and John Bowman of JBI. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Bowman 1, 821 F. Supp. at 1444.
89. Bowman I1, 65 F.3d at 857.
90. Bowman 1, 821 F.Supp. at 1446.
91. Bowman I1, 65 F.3d at 857-58.
92. Id. at 858 (citing 23 U.S.C. § 1346).
93. 718 P.2d 890 (Wyo. 1986) (holding that owner oil company's retention of control over
the deenergizing of power lines created a duty of care to the employees of an independent contractor hired to install the lines).
94. Bowman I, 65 F.3d at 858.
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the right to direct the manner of an independent contractor's performance, or
assume[d] affirmative duties with respect to safety," then the owner sufficiently controlled the worksite to create such a duty.95 However, if the owner
merely reserved and exercised the right to inspect work for adherence to contract terms, or retained only the right to require the contractor to observe safety rules, then the owner did not have a duty toward independent contractor
employees."
Applying these rules to the JBI contract, the court held that the United
States did not retain control over JBI's work performance or assume affirmative safety duties." Therefore, the United States did not maintain control over
the hazard that caused Bowman's injury and could not be held liable." Although the government retained and exercised the right to inspect the
workplace for adherence to the contract terms, this fact did not create a duty
towards Bowman."
C. Other Circuits
The Eleventh and Fourth Circuits also addressed the treatment of independent contractors under the FTCA during the survey period. In Tisdale v. United States,"° the Eleventh Circuit determined that the United States relinquished possession and control of property where an independent contractor's
employee suffered an injury. Under Georgia law, therefore, the independent contractor assumed the duties for keeping the premises safe."° The fact
that the United States retained authority to ensure performance of contract
obligations did not defeat a finding that the contractor controlled the
property. °3 The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not hold the United
States liable and affirmed summary judgment for the government."°
In Robb v. United States,1°5 the Fourth Circuit affirmed dismissal of
plaintiff's claim against the United States for alleged negligent treatment by
physicians at an Air Force hospital." The court characterized the physicians
as independent contractors, not employees of the United States' °7 Plaintiffs
could not hold the United States liable for the physicians' acts because the
FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for injuries resulting from the actions of independent contractors." The fact that the United States reserved

95. Id. at 859 (quoting Jones, 718 P.2d at 896).
96. Id. at 858.
97. Id. at 859.
98. Id. The court also reviewed analogous Wyoming state and Tenth Circuit cases to support
its holding. Id. at 859-61.
99. Id. at 859.
100. 62 F.3d 1367 (11 th Cir. 1995).
101. Tisdale, 62 F.3d at 1373.
102. Id. at 1372-73.
103. Id. at 1372.
104. Id.
105. 80 F.3d 884 (4th Cir. 1996).
106. Robb, 80 F.3d at 886.
107. Id. at 893.
108. Id. at 887.
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the right to evaluate the independent contractor's services did not create a
employer-employee relationship."l
D. Analysis
Bowman II met the FTCA's goal of holding the United States liable to the
extent that a private person would be liable under state law where the incident
occurred."0 Relevant Wyoming law has consistently precluded employer liability toward independent contractor employees where the employer did not retain sufficient control over the job site."' Wyoming courts have also routinely allowed employers to inspect performance and require observance of
safety standards without imposing liability."2 The Tenth Circuit's decision
conformed to these principles by recognizing that the United States lacked
control of the job site and was therefore not liable for Bowman's injuries."'

109. lId. at 893.
110. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).

111.

See e.g., Abraham v. Andrews Trucking Co., 893 P.2d 1156, 1157-58 (Wyo. 1995)

(holding that defendant employer did not owe employee of an independent contractor a legal duty

because defendant had not assumed control or affirmative safety duties at the job site); Ramsey v.
Pacific Power & Light, 792 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Wyo. 1990) (holding that defendant landowner was
not liable for injury of independent contractor's employee because owner did not have control of
the worksite at the time of injury); Cockburn v. Terra Resources, Inc., 794 P.2d 1334, 1342-43
(Wyo. 1990) (holding that defendant employer was not liable to injured employee of an independent contractor because defendant did not have a controlling and pervasive role at the work site);
Hill v. Pacific Power & Light, 765 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Wyo. 1988) (holding that defendant
landowner was not liable for injuries suffered by independent contractor's employee because defendant did not have control over details of the work performed and did not assume affirmative
safety duties); Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., Inc., 733 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Wyo. 1987) (holding
that defendant landowner was not liable to independent contractor's employee because no evidence existed that defendant had retained control of the work site or assumed safety duties).
112. See cases cited supra note 114. This view comports with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 414 cmt. c (1965) ("It is not enough that [the employer] has merely a general right...
to inspect [the independent contractor's] progress .... There must be such a retention of a right
of supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way.")
113. Bowman H also comports with previous Tenth Circuit opinions. See Flynn v. United
States, 631 F.2d 678, 681 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that the existence of a government safety program did not create liability where the contractor was primarily responsible for safety); Craghead
v. United States, 423 F.2d 664, 666 (10th Cir. 1970) (holding that the government's reservation of
the right of inspection and the right to enforce safety measures did not constitute control); Irzyk v.
United States 412 F.2d 749, 751 (10th Cir. 1969) (holding that the government's right and exercise of inspection of independent contractor's work did not render it liable); United States v. Page,
350 F.2d 28, 31 (10th Cir. 1965) (holding that government's safety program did not constitute
exercise of control); Grogan v. United States, 341 F.2d 39, 43 (10th Cir. 1965) (holding that the

government was not liable because it reserved the right to inspect the work of an independent
contractor or because of a contract provision requiring that the independent contractor observe

safety standards).
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Ill. DAMAGES UNDER THE FIrCA

A. Background
1. Damages under the FTCA
The United States is liable under the FFCA "in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not
be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages."'" 4 The
FTCA grants the jurisdiction to award "money damages.""' 5 As discussed
above, substantive state law where the conduct occurred determines government liability." 6 Subject to the FTCA's restrictions, state law also determines the nature and measure of damages."1 7 For example, courts apply state
law to determine the kind of damages recoverable,"' the amount recoverable,"19 application of collateral source rules,' comparative or contributory
negligence doctrines, 2' damage caps," 2 and indemnity and contribution
rules."' Courts apply federal law, however, when interpreting the FTCA's
prohibitions on punitive damages and prejudgment interest.'24
2. Periodic Payments
Traditionally, the common law allowed for payment of a damage award as
a single lump sum payment, also referred to as the single recovery rule."2
Periodic payment of damages, on the other hand, consists of an "arrangement
to compensate a claimant over time, rather than with a single lump sum. The
term means that the claimant will not receive compensation all at once, but

114. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). See generally MORRIS, supra note 24, § 4.1 (discussing how local
law applies to the government the same as to individuals under the FrCA).
117. 28 U.S.C. §1346(b); see also, JAYSON, supra note 3, § 226, at 10-12; MORRIS, supra
note 24 § 4.1; Walter D. Phillips, Damages Limitations Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 33
A.F. L. REV. 59, 63-66 (1990).
118. See JAYSON, supra note 3, § 226, at 10-14 to 10-18.
119. Id. § 228.01, at 10-41.
120. See Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 161 (1st Cir. 1988); Scheib v. Florida Sanitarium & Benevolent Assoc., 759 F.2d 859, 864 (11th Cir. 1985); Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d
924, 927 (3rd Cir. 1964).
121. See JAYSON, supra note 3, § 228.04, at 10-51.
122. See Carter v. United States, 982 F.2d 1141, 1143 (7th Cir. 1992); Lozada v. United
States, 974 F.2d 986, 987 (8th Cir. 1992); Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 416 (5th Cir.
1986); Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1985).
123. See JAYSON, supra note 3, § 228.06.
124. Id. § 226, at 10-20 to 10-21.
125. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pheifer, 462 U.S. 523, 533 (1983) ("The award
could in theory take the form of periodic payments, but in this country it has traditionally taken
the form of a lump sum, paid at the conclusion of the litigation."); Frankel v. United States, 466
F.2d 1226, 1228 (3rd Cir. 1972) ("[C]ourts of law had no power at common law to enter
judgment in terms other that a simple award of money damages."); DANIEL W. HINDERT ET AL.,
STRUCruRED SETTLEMENTS AND PERIODIc PAYMENT JUDGMENTS § 1.02[1] (1986); Thomas C.
Downs, Periodic Payment of Claims: New Hope for CERCLA Settlements?, 8 TUL. ENVTL. LJ.
387, 398 (1995); Ralph C. Thomas, Medical Prophesy and the Single Award: The Problem and a
Proposal,1 TULSA LJ. 135, 136 (1964).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2

will receive instead a promise from some entity to make future payments according to an agreed schedule."" 6 Most courts apply the single recovery rule
and only reluctantly implement periodic payment of judgments absent agreement of the parties, an overriding need to protect the victim, or statutory instruction.127 State legislation requiring periodic payments, however, has become prevalent in recent years, especially in the field of medical malpractice."
Whether the FTCA contemplates periodic payments remains unclear.
Some courts have interpreted the FTCA to allow only lump sum money judgments."2 However, other courts have structured damage awards in certain
situations.' 3 The Tenth Circuit became the first circuit court to address application of a state statute mandating periodic payments under the FTCA.

126. HINDERT Er AL., supra note 125, § 1.01[1], at 1-3. The term "periodic payment" applies
to both judgments and settlements; however, this paper focuses only on the periodic payment of
judgments. For general background on periodic payment of judgments and settlements see UNIF.
PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JuDGMENTS Acr, 14 U.L.A. 9 (Supp. 1996); HINDERT ET AL., supra note
125, § 1.02 at 1-6 to 1-7; Brian Brown & Lisa Chalidze, StructuredSettlements: An Overview, 22
VT. BJ. & L. DIG. 14 (1996); Richard L. Kligler, StructuredSettlements as a Negotiation Tool, in
EvALuATING AND SETrLING A PERSONAL INJURY CASE 1992, at 73 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 438, 1992); Marcus L. Plant, Periodic Payment of Damages for
PersonalInjury, 44 LA. L. REV. 1327 (1984); John W. Turk & William L. Winslow, Structured
Settlements in the 1990s, 49 J. Mo. B. 197 (1993); Dirk Yandell, Advantages and Disadvantages
of Structured Settlements, 5 J. LEGAL ECON. 71 (1995).
127. See cases cited infra note 129; Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 128
(1904) (holding that the district court lacked the power to order periodic payment of damages in a
wrongful death case); Gretchen v. United States, 618 F.2d 177, 181 n.5 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that
it is beyond the power of the court to order periodic payments without legislative authority); see
also HINDERT Er AL., supra note 125, § 1.02[2], at 1-8 ('The ...reasons why courts have not
fashioned periodic payment judgments are practicality and risk."); Downs, supra note 125, at 39899 ("An order requiring periodic payments, without specific statutory authority, appears to be improper as a matter of law.").
128. See HINDERT Er AL., supra note 125, § 1.02[3]. For examples of state statutes implementing periodic payments see id. at app. C(2); Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Validity of
State Statute Providingfor PeriodicPayment of Future Damages in Medical MalpracticeAction,
41 A.L.R. 4TH 275 (1985).
129. See Reilly, 863 F.2d at 169-70 (affirming the district court's insistence on lump sum
payment absent special circumstances); Frankel, 466 F.2d at 1228-29 (holding that district court
does not have power to make other then lump-sum money judgments absent Congressional authorization); Andrulonis v. United States, 724 F.Supp 1421, 1520 n.616 (N.D.N.Y. 1989) (court lacks
power to enter judgment other than lump sum award contemplated by FTCA), affd in part, rev'd
in parton other grounds, 924 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1991), vacated New York State Dep't of Health
v. Andrulonis, 502 U.S. 801 (1991); JAYSON, supra note 3, § 225, at 10-6.
130. See Hull v. United States, 971 F.2d 1499, 1505 (10th Cir. 1992) ('[Nlothing in the
FICA prohibits courts from exercising their inherent authority to structure awards... to ensure
that the damage recovery is in the best interest of the victim."); Reilly, 863 F.2d at 169 n.16 (concluding that periodic damage awards are permissible if a controlling statute permits, if the parties
in interest agree, or if it is necessary to ensure the victim receives his due); Robak v. United
1980) (allowing creation of a reversionary trust to which
States, 503 F.Supp. 982, 983 (N.D. Ill.
both parties agreed) aff d in part, rev'd in parton other grounds, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981).
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B. Hill v. United States 3'
1. Facts
On October 17, 1988, the parents of four and one-half month old Tasha
Hill took her to Evans Army Community Hospital in Fort Carson, Colorado .' 2 Physicians diagnosed and treated her for spinal meningitis.'33 As a
result of the doctors' alleged negligence, Tasha suffered severe, permanent
mental and physical disabilities." Plaintiffs asserted several claims of negligence, including failure to perform prompt assessment, delay of administration
of medication, absence of appropriate supervision by the attending physician,
unreliable medical records, and failure to treat complications of Tasha's men-

ingitis.
Because the government conceded liability, the trial addressed only the
issue of damages.'" The district court awarded plaintiff damages totaling
$13,528,400.137 The judge placed Tasha's damages in a trust, but refused to
include the government's proposed reversionary clause. 13 The clause would
permit any funds existing in the trust at Tasha's death to revert to the U.S.
Treasury.'39 The district court concluded that it could only implement a reversionary trust when considering the best interests of the victim." Since a
reversionary clause would benefit only the defendant, the court denied the request.' 4' The United States appealed the district court's refusal to grant the
United States a reversionary interest.
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the award of damages to Tasha's parents and
reversed on the issue of a reversionary trust. 43 The opinion addressed each
of the United States' arguments in turn.
The government argued that avoidance of the unjust enrichment of
Tasha's heirs necessitated the reversionary trust for Tasha's future damages. 1M Damages compensate Tasha for her expenses only; therefore, funds left
in the trust at Tasha's death should return to the government, not her es-

131. 81 F.3d 118 (10th Cir. 1996) (Hill l1), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 56 (1996).
132. Hill v. United States, 854 F.Supp 727, 729 (D. Colo. 1994) (Hill I), affd in part, 81
F.3d 118 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 56 (1996).
133. Hill , 854 F.Supp. at 729.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Hill v. United States, 864 F.Supp. 1030, 1031 (D. Colo. 1994) (Hill Ii), rev'd, 81 F.3d
118 (10th Cir. 1996) (Hill ItI), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 56 (1996).
138. Hill II, 864 F.Supp. at 1032.
139. Hill 111, 81 F.3d at 120.
140. Hill I, 864 F.Supp. at 1032 (citing Hull v. United States, 971 F.2d 1499, 1505 (10th Cir.
1992)).
141. Id
142. Hill III, 81 F.3d at 119.
143. Id. at 121.
144. Id.
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tare." The government based its argument on two theories: first, the court
can fashion a remedy that approximates a state statutory provision, and second, the court retains the inherent power to create a reversionary trust.' 4
The government's first theory relied on the Colorado Health Care Availability Act (HCAA). ' 7 The HCAA requires trial judges, in civil actions
against health care professionals and institutions,'" to order periodic payment of future damage awards exceeding $150,000." Payments cease at the
death of the tort victim, except for payment of loss of future earnings.'"
The United States argued that under the FTCA, courts must treat the government in the same manner as a private health care provider under like circumstances.' 5' Therefore the court should fashion a remedy that would "further the intent and approximate the outcome" of the HCAA even though the
statute did not specifically apply to the United States.'52 The government
supported this contention by citing cases that allowed the government to benefit from state damage caps even though the courts did not subject it to the
state statutory scheme. 3
The Tenth Circuit refused to rely on the state damage cap cases cited by
the government. 5 4 In those cases, the state statutes affected the parties in exactly the same manner as they would have if a private individual had injured
the victim. The court concluded that "[n]one of these cases offers direct support for the proposition that the United States may attempt to create a rough
equivalent to a state statute when they are clearly ineligible for the precise
remedy provided therein."'55 The court stated that the government's proposal
did not promote the FTCA's mandate for like treatment because, unlike the
HCAA, it allowed reversion of future earnings damages."
The court went on to conclude that the district court could create a reme5
The
dy that did approximate the result that the HCAA contemplated.
HCAA prevented damages paid for future medical costs from passing to the
victim's heirs at death.'58 Therefore, the government could receive a59reversionary interest in the damages awarded to Tasha for "life care costs.'
In its second theory, the government argued that the court had the inher-

145. Id.
146. Id. at 120-21.
147. Id. at 120 (citing Health Care Availability Act, CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-64-201 to -212
(Supp. 1996)).
148. "'Health care institution' means any licensed or certified hospital, health care facility,
dispensary, or other institution for the treatment or care of the sick or injured." CoLO.REV. STAT.
§ 13-64-202(3).
149. CoLO.REv. STAT. § 13-64-203. If the award for future damages is equal to or less than
$150,000, then the court may order periodic payments. Id. (emphasis added).
150. CoLO.REv. STAT. § 13-64-206(3).
151. Hill 111, 81 F.3d at 120.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 120-21.
154. Id. at 121.
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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ent power to create a reversionary trust under Hull v. United States. 6 In
Hull, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court had the inherent power to
create a reversionary trust in the victim's best interest. 6' This power ensured
that the victim would receive the benefit of his award. 62 The Hill III court
refused to rely on Hull since the reversionary trust clearly did not benefit
Tasha 63
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision focused on application of the FTCA's "like
treatment" provision. The court's authorization of a reversionary trust treated
the government in the same manner as a private health care provider. If doctors in a private hospital had injured Tasha, she would have received future
care damages in periodic payments ending at her death. Likewise, the United
States' payment of future damages will end at Tasha's death. The court also
relied on relevant state law to determine the extent of the government's liability, as dictated by the FTCA.
The court's opinion, however, did not address the possible conflict of state
periodic payment statutes and the FTCA's grant of jurisdiction to award "money damages."'" In Frankel v. Heym,'" the Third Circuit interpreted the
FTCA to allow only lump sum awards."6 If the FTCA's term "money damages" contemplates only one-time, lump-sum payments, an internal conflict
arises when the FTCA also requires application of state law which mandates
periodic payments. It is unclear whether the "money damages" term or the
incorporated state statute should control. In the only decision to directly address the issue, the First Circuit suggested in dicta that the state statute would
control.
Considering important policy issues involved in periodic payments,"6 and the narrow construction required for waivers of sovereign im-

160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. (citing Hull v. United States, 971 F.2d 1499, 1504-05 (10th Cir. 1992).
Hull, 971 F.2d at 1504.
Id. at 1506.
Hill!11, 81 F.3d at 121.

164. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
165. 466 F.2d 1226 (3rd Cir. 1972).
166. Frankel,466 F.2d at 1228-29.
[S]ection 1346(b) authorizes district courts to entertain "civil actions on claims against
the United States, for money damages .... " Arguably, this language at least implies
that primary awards in such civil suits must take the form of common law's money
judgments, the only form of "money damages" known to the common law ....
[I]n
administering the legislation in question a district court should not make other than
lump-sum money judgments unless and until Congress shall authorize a different type of
award. The relaxation of sovereign immunity is peculiarly a matter of legislative concern, responsibility and policy. If novel types of awards are to be permitted against the
government, Congress should affirmatively authorize them.

Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
167. Reilly, 863 F.2d at 169 n.16 ("Periodic damage awards are permissible in lieu of lump
sums ... if a controlling statute permits ... "). But see Phillips, supra note 117, at 65 (concluding that state periodic payment statutes "do not apply to the United States because the FTCA
establishes federal procedural law, which is independent of the FTCA's reliance upon state substantive law ... .
168. For the pros of structured judgments, see UNIF. PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT,
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munity,'" other courts may side with the Frankel court and await Congressional authorization to award periodic payment judgments under the FTCA.
On the other hand, considering the emerging popularity of periodic payments, 7 courts could favor state periodic payment statutes, as the Tenth Circuit did in Hill III. In addition, future Congressional approval of periodic payment judgment appears uncertain. Congress recognized periodic payment judgments in at least two instances, childhood vaccinations 71 and the Internal
Revenue Code. 72 However, Congress failed to pass President Clinton's proposed Health Care Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement Act of
1992."' This act would have amended the FTCA to allow periodic payment
of future economic loss damages in health care liability actions against the
United States.1 74 Until Congress resolves the issue, federal courts continue to
confront the periodic payment issue.
CONCLUSION

The Tenth Circuit addressed three different aspects of the FICA during
the survey period. In both Tew and Bowman, the court followed precedent and
maintained a conservative approach in construing government liability. In Hill
III, the court struck new ground by finding that the FTCA allowed the government to receive a reversionary interest in future damages awarded to private

commissioner's prefatory note, 14 U.L.A. 10-12 (Supp. 1996); Memorandum by Jeffrey Axelrad
on Structured Settlements (July 1, 1992), in DAMAGES UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT,
522-89 (Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice 1992); HINDERT ET AL., supra note 125, § 1.03[l] to
1.04; Plant, supra note 126, at 1329-40. For the cons of structured judgments, see Smith v.
Meyers, 887 P.2d 541, 548 (Ariz. 1994) (holding that state statutory periodic payment scheme for
future damages in medical malpractice actions impermissibly limited right of plaintiffs to recover
damages); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 836 (N.H. 1980) (holding that statute requiring periodic payment of future damages violated equal protection clause of state constitution); HINDERT
Er AL., supra note 125, § 1.04; Philip H. Corboy, Structured Injustice: Compulsory Periodic Payment of Judgments, 66 A.B.A. J. 1524 (1980).
169. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979) ("We should also have in mind that
the [FrCA] waives the immunity of the United States and that in construing... a condition of
that waiver, we should not take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended."); Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957) ("Mhis Court has long
decided that limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be
strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied."). But see Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955) ("There is nothing in the Tort Claims Act which shows that
Congress intended to draw distinctions so finespun and capricious as to be almost incapable of
being held in the mind for adequate formulation.").
170. States utilize periodic payments in many areas, including child support, workers' compensation, alimony, automotive accident liability, and, of course, medical malpractice. See
HINDERT ET AL., supra note 125, § 1.0213], app. C; Downs, supra note 125, at 399-401.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(f)(4) (1994) (allowing courts to order purchase of an annuity, with
permission of the petitioner, for damages in childhood vaccination cases).
172. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994) (providing that personal injury damages received in periodic payments are not included in calculations of gross income). See generally HINDERT ET AL.,
supra note 125, § 2.01.
173. Health Care Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement Act of 1992, S. 3387,
102d Cong. (1992).
174. S.3387 § 402.
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citizens. With a growing number of state tort reform statutes requiring periodic payment of damages, future decisions must resolve the conflict between the
FTCA's term "money damages" and the term requiring application of relevant
state law.
Kerstin E. Cass

